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Software-defined networking (SDN) decouples the control and data planes of traditional networks, logically
centralizing the functional properties of the network in the SDN controller. While this centralization brought advantages
such as a faster pace of innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional architectures against
different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been concerned with the functional side, despite some specific
works concerning non-functional properties like ‘security’ or ‘dependability’. Though addressing the latter in an ad-hoc,
piecemeal way, may work, it will most likely lead to efficiency and effectiveness problems.
We claim that the enforcement of non-functional properties as a pillar of SDN robustness calls for a systemic
approach. We further advocate, for its materialization, the re-iteration of the successful formula behind SDN –
‘logical centralization’. As a general concept, we propose anchor, a subsystem architecture that promotes the logical
centralization of non-functional properties. To show the effectiveness of the concept, we focus on ‘security’ in this
paper: we identify the current security gaps in SDNs and we populate the architecture middleware with the appropriate
security mechanisms, in a global and consistent manner. Essential security mechanisms provided by anchor include
reliable entropy and resilient pseudo-random generators, and protocols for secure registration and association of SDN
devices.
We claim and justify in the paper that centralizing such mechanisms is key for their effectiveness, by allowing
us to: define and enforce global policies for those properties; reduce the complexity of controllers and forwarding
devices; ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services; foster interoperability of the non-functional property
enforcement mechanisms; and promote the security and resilience of the architecture itself. We discuss design and
implementation aspects, and we prove and evaluate our algorithms and mechanisms, including the formalisation of
the main protocols and the verification of their core security properties using the Tamarin prover.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) moves the control function out of the forwarding devices, logically
centralizing the functional properties of the network. This decoupling between control and data plane
leads to higher flexibility and programmability of network control, enabling fast innovation. In spite of all
these benefits, this decoupling, associated with a common southbound API (e.g., OpenFlow), has removed
an important natural protection of traditional networks. Specifically, the heterogeneity and diversity of
configuration protocols, the closed (and proprietary) nature of the devices, and the distributed nature of the
control plane. Hence, from a security perspective, SDN introduces new attack vectors and radically changes
the threat surface [37, 71, 112].
So far, the SDN literature has been mostly concerned with functional properties, such as improved
routing and traffic engineering [8, 58, 78], efficient topology discovery [96], enhanced network security
services [3, 55, 104, 113], among others, by exploiting the ability to program the control plane.
Non-functional properties are those related to reaching goals of quality of the operation of the global
system, rather than to its specific behavior. However, SDN currently leaves the achievement of non-functional
properties to individual mechanisms or services. Works having recently seen the light, concerned in principle
with non-functional properties, address specific implementations of functions or services, albeit dependability-
related [17, 26, 60, 70, 107] or security-related [101, 112, 116, 117]. To give an example, security services such
as firewalls or Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) mechanisms for attack detection and mitigation, rely essentially
on functional properties of the network, i.e., they are concerned with the SDN function of generating and
remotely installing the appropriate flow rules in the data plane.
As effective as the former examples may be, their impact on the desired system-level non-functional
property (say, integrity, or availability) ends-up being bottom-up, in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way. It may work
for specific cases, but generically, it is most likely to create gaps in the enforcement of the property, which
would inevitably lead to efficiency and effectiveness problems (as we indeed show in Section 3). For instance:
insecure control plane associations or communications, network information disclosure, spoofing attacks, and
hijacking of devices can easily compromise the network operation; performance crises can escalate to globally
affect QoS; unavailability and lack of reliability of controllers, forwarding devices, or clock synchronization
parameters can considerably degrade network operation [4, 66, 112].
We claim that the coherent enforcement of non-functional properties is a pillar of SDN robustness, but
it currently lacks a systemic, top-down approach. As such, in this paper we propose a re-iteration of the
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successful formula behind SDN – ‘logical centralization’ – for its materialization. We believe this step is
critical to the successful deployment of SDN, especially at infrastructure/enterprise scale.
In fact, the problematic scenarios exemplified above can be best avoided by the logical centralization of
the system-wide enforcement of non-functional properties, increasing the chances that the whole architecture
inherits them in a more balanced and coherent way. The steps to achieve such goal are to: (a) select the
crucial properties to enforce (dependability, security, quality-of-service, etc.); (b) identify the current gaps
that stand in the way of achieving such properties in SDNs; (c) design a logically-centralized subsystem
architecture and middleware, with hooks to the main SDN architectural components, in a way that they
can inherit the desired properties; and (d) populate the middleware with the appropriate mechanisms
and protocols to enforce the desired properties/predicates, across controllers and devices, in a global and
consistent manner.
Generically speaking, it is worth emphasizing that centralization has been proposed as a means to address
different problems of current networks. For instance, the use of centralized cryptography schemes and
centralized sources of trust to authenticate and authorize known entities has been pointed out as a solution
for improving the security of Ethernet networks [64]. Similarly, recent research has suggested network
security as a service as a means to provide the required security of enterprise networks [112]. However,
centralization has its drawbacks, so let us explain why centralization of non-functional property enforcement
brings important gains to software-defined networking. We claim, and justify ahead in the paper, that
it allows to define and enforce global policies for those properties, reduce the complexity of networking
devices, ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services, foster interoperability of the non-functional
enforcement mechanisms, and better promote the resilience of the architecture itself.
To achieve these goals, we propose anchor, a subsystem architecture that does not modify the essence of
the current SDN architecture with its payload controllers and devices, but rather stands aside, ‘anchors’
(logically-centralizes) crucial functionality and properties, and ‘hooks’ to the latter components, in order
to secure the desired properties. The reader will note that this design philosophy concerns any kind of
non-functional properties. To prove our point, in this paper we have chosen security as our use case and
identified at least four gaps that stand in the way of achieving the former goals in current SDN systems: (i)
security-performance gap; (ii) complexity-robustness gap; (iii) global security policies gap; and (iv) resilient
roots-of-trust gap. The security-performance gap comes from the frequent conflict between mechanisms
enforcing those two properties. The complexity-robustness gap represents the conflict between the current
complexity of security and cryptography implementations, and the negative impact this has on robustness
and hence correctness. The lack of global security policies leads to ad-hoc and discretionary solutions creating
weak spots in architectures. The lack of a resilient root-of-trust burdens controllers and devices with trust
enforcement mechanisms that are ad-hoc, have limited reach and are often sub-optimal. We further elaborate
in the paper on the reasons behind these gaps, their negative effects in SDN architectures, and how they
can possibly be mitigated through a logically-centralized security enforcement architecture. That is, in this
particular case study, the architecture middleware is populated with specific functionality whose main aim is
to ensure the ‘security’ of control plane associations and of communication amongst controllers and devices.
In addition, in this paper we give first steps in addressing a long-standing problem, the fact that a single
root-of trust — like anchor, but also like any other standard trusted-third-party, like e.g., CAs in X.509
PKI or the KDC in Kerberos — is a single point failure (SPoF). There is nothing wrong with SPoFs, as
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long as they fail rarely, and/or the consequences of failure can be mitigated, which is unfortunately not the
common case. As such, we start by carefully promoting reliability in the design of anchor, endowing it with
robust functions in the different modules, in order to reduce the probability of failure/compromise. Moreover,
the proposed architecture only requires symmetric key cryptography. This not only ensures a very high
performance, but also makes the system secure against attacks by a quantum computer. Thus, the system is
also post-quantum secure [19]. Second, we mitigate the consequences of successful attacks, by protecting
past, pre-compromise communication, and ensuring the quasi-automatic recovery of anchor after detection,
even in the face of total control by an adversary, achieving respectively, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and
post-compromise security (PCS). Third, since protocol designs are normally error prone, we formalise our
protocol using a symbolic model and verify its core properties using the Tamarin prover [85]. Finally, our
architecture promotes resilience, or the continued prevention of failure/compromise by automatic means.
Though out of scope of this paper, the resilience of anchor using fault and intrusion tolerance techniques is
part of our plans for future work, as we discuss in Section 8.
To summarize, the key contributions of our work include the following: (1) the concept of logical
centralization of SDN non-functional properties provision; (2) the blueprint of an architectural framework
based on middleware composed of a central ‘anchor’, and local ‘hooks’ in controllers and devices, hosting
whatever functionality needed to enforce these properties; (3) A gap analysis concerning barriers in the
achievement of non-functional properties in the security domain, as a proof-of-concept case study; (4)
Definition, design and implementation of the mechanisms and algorithms to populate the middleware
in order to fill those gaps, and achieve a logically-centralized security architecture that is reliable and
efficient; (5) The enforcement of strong properties such as post-quantum security, perfect forward secrecy,
and post-compromise recovery. As we discuss in Section 8, these properties are not ensured by previous
work and thus represent a clear advance over the state-of-the-art on SDN security; (6) A formalisation of
the main protocol, and a formal verification of its correctness and core security properties, through symbolic
modelling using the Tamarin prover; (7) Evaluation of the proposed mechanisms.
We show that, compared to the state-of-the-art in SDN security, our solution preserves at least the same
security functionality, but achieves higher levels of implementation robustness, by vulnerability reduction,
while providing high performance. Whilst we try to prove our point with security, our contribution is generic
enough to inspire further research concerning other non-functional properties (such as dependability or
quality-of-service). It is also worth emphasizing that the architectural concept that we propose in this
paper would require a greater effort to be deployed in traditional networks, due to the heterogeneity of the
infrastructure and its vertical integration. This will be made clear throughout the paper.
We have structured the paper as follows. Section 2 gives the rationale and presents the generic logically-
centralized architecture for the system-wide enforcement of non-functional properties, and explains its
benefits and limitations. In Section 3, we discuss the challenges and requirements brought by the current gaps
in security-related non-functional properties. Section 4 describes the logically-centralized security architecture
that we propose, along with its mechanisms and algorithms. The main algorithms are co-designed with a
formal model, and the formal verification of their security properties is presented in Section 5. Then, in
Sections 6 and 7, we discuss design and implementation aspects of the architecture, and present evaluation
results. In Sections 8 and 9, we give a brief overview of related work, discuss some challenges and justify
some design options of our architecture. Finally, in Section 10, we conclude.
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2 THE ANCHOR ARCHITECTURE
In this section we introduce anchor, a general architecture for logically-centralized enforcement of non-
functional properties – such as ‘security’, ‘dependability’, or ‘quality-of-service’ (Figure 1) – in SDN. The
logical centralization of the provision of non-functional properties allows us to: (1) define and enforce global
policies for those properties; (2) reduce the complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; (3) ensure
higher levels of robustness for critical services; (4) foster interoperability of the non-functional property
enforcement mechanisms; and finally (5) better promote the resilience of the architecture itself. Let us
explain the rationale for these claims.
Define and enforce global policies for non-functional properties. One can enforce non-functional properties
through piece-wise, partial policies. But it is easier and less error-prone, as attested by SDN architectures
with respect to the functional properties, to enforce e.g., security policies, from a central trust point, in a
globally consistent way. Especially when one considers changing policies during system lifetime.
Reduce the complexity of controllers and forwarding devices. One of the ideas of SDN was exactly to
simplify the construction of devices, by stripping them of functionality, centralized on controllers. We are
extending the scope of the concept, by relieving both controllers and devices from ad-hoc and redundant
implementations of mechanisms that are bound to have a critical impact on the whole network.
Ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services. Enforcing non-functional properties like dependabil-
ity or security has a critical scope, as it potentially affects the entire network. Unfortunately, the robustness of
devices and controllers is still a concern, as they are becoming rather complex, which leads to several critical
vulnerabilities, as amply exemplified in [112]. A centralized concept as we advocate might considerably
improve on the situation, exactly because the enforcement of non-functional properties would be achieved
through a specialized (carefully designed and verified) subsystem, minimally interfering with the SDN
payload architecture.
Foster interoperability of the non-functional property enforcement mechanisms. Different controllers require
different configurations today, and a potential lack of interoperability in terms of non-functional properties
arises. Having global policies and mechanisms for non-functional property enforcement also creates an easier
path to foster controller and device interoperability (e.g., East and Westbound APIs).
Better promote the resilience of the architecture itself. Having a specialized subsystem architecture already
helps for a start, since for example, its operation is not affected by latency and throughput fluctuations of
the (payload) control platforms themselves. However, the considerable advantage of both the decoupling
and the centralization is that it becomes straightforward to design in security and dependability measures
for the architecture itself, such as advanced techniques and mechanisms to tolerate faults and intrusions
(and in essence overcome the main disadvantage of centralization, the potential single-point-of-failure risk).
The outline of our architecture is depicted in Figure 1. The “logically-centralized” perspective of non-
functional property enforcement is materialized through a subsystem architecture relying on an anchor of
trust, a middleware whose main aim is to ensure that certain properties – e.g., the security of control plane
associations and of communication amongst controllers and devices – are met throughout the architecture.
In a manner similar to traditional security services, such as Kerberos and RADIUS, anchor is a set
of services for the SDN architecture. It ‘anchors’ crucial functionality and properties, and ‘hooks’ to the
former components, in order to secure the desired properties. So, on the devices, we just need the local
Manuscript accepted for publication in ACM TOPS
6 Kreutz, D. et al
Net	App	Net	App	
SDN Controller
Network		
Opera,ng	System	
Net	App	Net	App	
FLOW	TABLES	
Net	App	Net	App	
SDN Forwarding Device
ANCHOR
Fig. 1. anchor general architecture
counterparts to the anchor middleware mechanisms and protocols, or hooks, to interpret and follow the
anchor’s instructions. In contrast to traditional services, however, anchor targets SDN infrastructures –
its advantage over existing systems is in part due to its specificity to this domain.
After having made the case for logically-centralized non-functional property enforcement in SDN, and
presenting the outline of our general architecture, in the next two sections we introduce the use case we
elected to show in this paper, i.e., logically-centralized security. We start with a gap analysis that establishes
the requirements for the architecture functionality in Section 3, and then, in Section 4, we show how to
populate anchor with the necessary mechanisms and protocols to meet those requirements.
3 CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY
3.1 Security 𝑣𝑠 performance
The security-performance gap comes from the conflict between ensuring high performance and using
secure primitives. This gap affects directly the control plane communication, which is the crucial link
between controllers and forwarding devices, allowing remote configuration of the data plane at runtime.
Control channels need to provide high performance (high throughput and low latency) while keeping the
communication secure.
The latency experienced by control plane communication is particularly critical for SDN operation. The
increased latency is a problem per se, in terms of reduced responsiveness, but may also limit control plane
scalability, which can be particularly problematic in large datacenters [15]. Most of the existing commercial
switches already show low control plane performance with TCP (e.g., a few hundred flows/s [70], Section
V.A.). Adding security worsens the problem: previous works have demonstrated that the use of cryptographic
primitives has a perceivable impact on the latency of sensitive communication in OpenFlow-enabled
networks [72, 73], in HTTPS connections [88], among other examples.
Ideally, we would want both security robustness and performance on control plane channels. In the context
of the security-performance gap, some directions that we point to in our architectural proposal ahead are,
for instance: the careful selection of cryptographic primitives [72]; the adoption of cryptographic libraries
exhibiting a good performance-security tradeoff, such as NaCl [18]; and/or mechanisms that allow cheap
per-message one-time-key distribution [72, 73]. We return to these mechanisms later.
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3.2 Complexity 𝑣𝑠 robustness
The complexity-robustness gap represents the conflict between the current complexity of security based
on cryptography and system implementations, and the negative impact this has on robustness and hence
correctness, hindering the ultimate goal.
In the past few years, several studies have recurrently shown critical misuse issues of cryptographic APIs
of different TLS implementations [28, 43, 105]. One of the main root causes of these problems is the inherent
complexity of traditional solutions and the knowledge required to use them without compromising security.
For instance, recent reports have found different vulnerabilities in TLS implementations and have shown
that long-standing implementations, such as OpenSSL, including its extensive cryptography, is unlikely to
be completely verified in the near future [22, 44]. To address this issue, a few projects, such as miTLS [24]
and Everest [23], propose new and verified implementations of TLS. However, several challenges remain to
be addressed before having a solution ready for wide use [23].
While the problem persists, the number of security incidents remains non-negligible. Recent examples
include vulnerabilities that allow the recovery of the secret key of OpenSSL at low cost [131], and timing
attacks that explore vulnerabilities in both PolarSSL and OpenSSL [12, 27]. On the other hand, failures
in classical PKI-based authentication and authorisation subsystems have been persistently happening [36,
52, 103], with the sheer complexity of those systems being considered one of the root causes behind these
problems.
Similarly to the cryptographic APIs example, the leading cause of most security issues in systems – and
this includes SDN controllers, operating systems, hypervisors, etc. – is the inherent complexity of their
implementation and the amount of aggregated functions and services, resulting in challenging ecosystems
in terms of security [11, 38, 53, 65, 76, 100, 114, 118, 121, 132]. It is recognized by the community that
complexity reduction (e.g., by means of isolation, modularization, reduced and verifiable code bases, loosely
coupled and well-defined micro-services) plays a vital role in ensuring the security of systems.
Considering the widely acknowledged principle that simplicity is key to robustness, especially for secure
systems, we advocate and try to demonstrate in this paper, that the complexity-robustness gap can be
reduced through less complex but equally secure alternative solutions. For instance, we will show that it is
possible to reduce complexity (when compared to traditional solutions, such as PKI/X.509 and TLS), and
yet improve on security, by designing simple and efficient protocols for the secure registration and association
of network devices. By following this direction, we are applying the same principle of vulnerability reduction
used in other systems, such as unikernels, where the idea is to reduce the attack surface by generating a
smaller overall footprint of the operating system and applications [128].
3.3 Global security policies
The impact of the lack of global security policies can be illustrated with different examples. Although ONF
describes data authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and freshness as fundamental requirements to ensure the
security of control plane communication in SDN, it does so in an abstract way, and these measures are often
ignored, or implemented in an ad-hoc manner [112]. Another example is the lack of strong authentication
and authorisation in the control plane. Recent reports show that widely used controllers, such as Floodlight
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and OpenDaylight, employ weak network authentication mechanisms [76, 112, 114, 126]. This leads to any
forwarding device being able to connect to any controller.
From a security perspective, it is non-controversial that device identification, authentication and au-
thorization should be among the forefront requirements of any network. All data plane devices should
be appropriately registered and authenticated within the network domain, with each association request
between any two devices (e.g., between a switch and a controller) being strictly authorized by a security
policy enforcement point. In addition, control traffic should be secured, since it is the fundamental vehicle
for network control programmability. This begs the question: why aren’t these mechanisms employed in
most deployments?
A reason for the current state of affairs is the lack of awareness, guidance, and enforcement policies. It is
therefore becoming crucial to define and establish global policies, and design, or adopt, the mechanisms
needed to enforce them and meet the essential requirements (e.g., secure authentication and trustworthy
authorization), to fill the policy gap.
3.4 Resilient roots-of-trust
A globally recognized, resilient root-of-trust, could dramatically improve the global security of SDN, since
current approaches to achieve trust are ad-hoc and partial [1]. Solving this gap would certainly assist
in fostering global mechanisms to ensure trustworthy registration and association between devices, as
discussed before, but the benefits would go beyond that. For instance, a root-of-trust can be used to provide
fundamental mechanisms (e.g., sources of strong entropy or pseudo-random generators (PRGs)), which
would serve as building blocks for specific security functions.
As a first example, modern cryptography relies heavily on strong keys and the ability to keep them secret.
The core feature that defines a strong key is its randomness. However, the randomness of keys is still a
widely neglected issue [123] and, not surprisingly, weak entropy, and weak random number generation have
been the cause of several significant vulnerabilities [63]. Even long-standing cryptographic libraries such as
OpenSSL have been recurrently affected by this problem [63, 94]. Importantly, recent research has shown
that this problem also affects networking equipment [6, 50, 51]. For instance, a common pattern found in
low-resource devices, such as switches, is that the random number generator of the operating system may
lack the input of external sources of entropy to generate reliable cryptographic keys.
It is worth emphasizing that the resilient roots-of-trust gap lies exactly in the relative trust that can
be put in partial ad-hoc implementations of critical functions by controller developers and manufacturers
of devices, in contrast to a careful, once-and-for-all architectural approach that can be reinstantiated in
different SDN deployments. The list not being exhaustive, we claim that strong sources of entropy, resilient,
indistinguishable-from-random number generators, and accurate, non-forgeable global time services, are
fitting examples of such critical functions to be provided by logically-centralized roots-of-trust, helping close
the former gap.
4 LOGICALLY-CENTRALIZED SECURITY
In this section we introduce the specialization of the anchor architecture for logically-centralized security
properties enforcement (Figure 2), guided by the conclusions from the previous section. Our main goal is to
provide security properties such as authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality for control plane communication.
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To achieve this goal, the anchor provides mechanisms (e.g., registration, authentication, a source of strong
entropy, a PRG) required to fulfill some of the major security requirements of SDNs.
As illustrated in Figure 2, we “anchor” the enforcement of security properties on anchor, which provides
all the necessary mechanisms and protocols to achieve the goal. It is also a central point for enforcing security
policies by means of services such as device registration, device association, controller recommendation, or
global time, thereby reducing the burden on controllers and forwarding devices, which just need the local
hooks, protocol elements that interpret and follow the anchor’s instructions.
FLOW	TABLES	
SDN Device
Crypto	
iDVV	
FLOW	TABLES	
SDN Device
Crypto	
iDVV	
Net	App	Net	App	
SDN Controller
Network	
Opera9ng	
System	
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FLOW	TABLES	
Net	App	Net	App	
SDN Device
Device	Registra9on	
Device	Associa9on	
Controller	
Recommenda9on	
ANCHOR
Crypto	
Crypto	
iDVV	
iDVV	
Crypto	
iDVV	
Global	Time	
Fig. 2. Logically-centralized Security
Next, we review the components and essential security services provided by anchor. We first illustrate, in
Section 4.1, how we implement our strategy of improving the robustness of anchor as a single root-of-trust,
by hardening anchor in the face of failures. For example, concerning the mitigation of possible (though
expectedly infrequent) security failures, we provide countermeasures such as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
and Post-Compromise Security (PCS), protecting pre- and post-compromise communications in the presence
of successful attacks. Next, we propose a source of strong entropy (Section 4.2) and a resilient pseudo
random generator (Section 4.3) for generating security-sensitive materials. These are crucial components, as
attested by the impact of vulnerabilities discovered in the recent past, in sub-optimal implementations of
the former in several software packages [20, 86, 110, 136]. We implement and evaluate the robustness of
these mechanisms. We also leverage a recently proposed mechanism, the integrated device verification value
(iDVV), to simplify authentication, authorization, and key generation amongst SDN components [72], which
we review and put in the context of anchor (Section 4.4). Namely, the iDVV protocol runs between the
anchor, and the hooks in controllers and switching devices. We implement and evaluate iDVV generators
for OpenFlow-enabled control plane communication. After defining system roles and its setup in Section 4.5,
we present two essential services for secure network operation — device registration (Section 4.6) and
device association (Section 4.7) — and we describe how the above mechanisms interplay with our secure
device-to-device communication approach (Section 4.8). The list of services of anchor is certainly not closed.
One can think of other functionalities, such as tracking of forwarding devices association, alert generation in
case of anomalous behaviours (e.g., recurrent reconnections), and so forth.
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In what follows, we describe the main anchor services in detail. To help the reader following our
descriptions, we summarize the most important notations used in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of notations
Notation Description Example
𝐻 Cryptographic hash function SHA512
𝑀𝐴𝐶 Message Authentication Code algorithm Poly1305
𝑋,𝑌 One entity belonging to {𝐴, 𝐷𝑖, 𝑀 , 𝐶, 𝐹} Device (e.g., switch) 𝑖
𝐾𝑒𝑋𝑌 Encryption secret key used between entities X and Y 256 bits random key
𝐾ℎ𝑋𝑌 MAC/HMAC secret key used between entities X and Y 256 bits random key
𝐸𝑋𝑌 Encryption primitive using secret key 𝐾𝑒𝑋𝑌 AES
[],𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑋𝑌 keyed-Hash MAC of message [] using secret key 𝐾ℎ𝑋𝑌 HMAC-SHA512
KDF Key Derivation Function OpenSSL PBKDF2
4.1 Hardening ANCHOR
The compromise of a root-of-trust is of great concern, since crucial services normally depend on it being secure
and dependable. As we stated before, we have a long-term strategy towards the resilience of anchor. In the
context of this paper, it starts by improving the inherent reliability of its simplex (non-replicated) version, by
hardening it in the face of failures. For instance, different from existing traditional security services such as
Kerberos and RADIUS, we still provide some security guarantees even when anchor has been compromised.
In particular, we propose protocols to achieve two security properties guaranteeing respectively, the security
of past (pre-compromise) communications, and of future (post-recovery) communications. This provides a
significant improvement over other existing root-of-trust infrastructures.
The first security property is perfect forward secrecy (PFS), namely, the assurance that the compromise
of all secrets in a current session does not compromise the confidentiality of the communications of the past
sessions. The enforcement of PFS is systematically approached in the algorithms we present next.
The second property is post-compromise security (PCS). While PFS considers how to protect the past
communications, PCS considers how to automatically reinstate and re-establish the secure communication
channels, for future communications. This security property has so far been considered only in the specific
scenario of secure messaging [135], and only limited works [133, 134] are available. In particular, we consider
that when anchor has been compromised by an attacker (e.g., through the exploitation of software
vulnerabilities), and has been reinstated by the operator (e.g., by applying software patches and rebuilding
servers), the system should have a way to automatically re-establish secure communications between anchor
and all other participants, without having to reinstate these components (controllers and forwarding devices
in this case, whose shared secrets became compromised). In particular, in Section 4.9 we explain how to
re-establish secure communication channels in a semi-automatic way, after complete failure of anchor.
In summary, even though anchor is a single root-of-trust in our system, we mitigate the associated risks
by guaranteeing:
∙ PFS: the compromise of anchor in the current session does not expose past communications;
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∙ PCS: when anchor is compromised and reinstated, anchor can automatically re-establish secure
communication channels with all other participants in the system to protect the security of future
communications.
As a side note, since our system only uses symmetric key cryptography, it will stand up even against an
attacker with quantum computers. In other words, our infrastructure will be post-quantum secure (PQS).
4.2 A source of strong entropy
Entropy still represents a challenge for modern computers because they have been designed to behave
deterministically [123]. Sources of true randomness (e.g., physical phenomena such as atmospheric noise)
can be difficult to use because they work differently from a typical computer.
To avoid the pitfalls of weak sources of entropy, in particular in networking devices, anchor provides a
source of strong entropy to ensure the randomness required to generate seeds, pseudorandom values, secrets,
among other cryptographic material. The strong source of entropy has the following property:
Strong Entropy - Every value entropy returned by entropy_get is indistinguishable-from-random.
Algorithm 1 shows how the external (from other devices) and internal (from the local operating system)
sources of entropy are kept updated and used to generate random bytes per function call (entropy_get()).
The state of the internal and external entropy is initially set by calling the entropy_setup(data). This
function requires an input data, which can be a combination of current system time, process number, bytes
from special devices, among other things, and random bytes (rand_bytes()) from a local (deterministic)
source of entropy (e.g., /dev/urandom) to initialize the state of the entropy generator. As we cannot assume
anything regarding the predictability of the input data, we use it in conjunction with a rand_bytes() function
call (line 2). A call to rand_bytes() is assumed to return (by default) 64 bytes of random data.
Algorithm 1: Source of strong entropy
1: entropy_setup(data)
2: e_entropy ← rand_bytes() ⊕ H(data)
3: i_entropy ← rand_bytes() ⊕ e_entropy
4: entropy_update()
5: e_entropy ← H(𝑃𝑖||𝑃𝑗) ⊕ i_entropy
6: E_counter ← 0
7: entropy_get()
8: if E_counter >= MAX_LONG call entropy_update()
9: i_entropy ← H(rand_bytes() || E_counter)
10: entropy ← e_entropy ⊕ i_entropy
Function entropy_update() uses as input the statistics of external sources and the anchor’s own packet
arrival rate to update the external entropy. The noise (events) of the external sources of entropy is stored in
32 pools (𝑃0, 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, ..., 𝑃31), as suggested by previous work [46]. Each pool has an event counter, which
is reset to zero once the pool is used to update the external entropy. At every update, two different pools
of noise (𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗) are used as input of a hashing function 𝐻. The two pools of noise can be randomly
selected, for instance. The output of this function is XORed with the internal entropy to generate the new
state of the external entropy. It is worth emphasizing that entropy_update() is automatically called when
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E_counter (the global event counter) reaches its maximum value and whenever needed, i.e., the user can
define when to do the function call.
The resulting 64 bytes of entropy, indistinguishable-from-random bytes (entropy_get()), are the outcome
of an XOR operation between the external and internal entropy. While the external entropy provides the
unpredictability required by strong entropy, the internal source provides a good, yet predictable [123],
continuous source of entropy. At each time the entropy_get() function is called, the internal entropy is
updated by using a local source of random data, which is typically provided by a library or by the operating
system itself, and the global number of events currently in the 32 pools of noise (𝐸_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟). These two
values are used as input of a hashing function 𝐻.
Such sources of strong entropy can be achieved in practice by combining different sources of noise, such as
the unpredictability of network traffic [48], the unpredictability of idleness of links [16], packet arrival rate
of network controllers, and sources of entropy provided by operating systems. We provide implementation
details in Section 6.1. A discussion about the correctness of Algorithm 1 can be found in Appendix A of [74].
4.3 Pseudorandom generator (PRG)
A source of entropy is necessary but not sufficient. Most cryptographic algorithms are highly vulnerable
weaknesses of random generators [41]. For instance, nonces generated with weak pseudo-random generators
can lead to attacks capable of recovering secret keys. Different security properties need to be ensured when
building strong pseudo-random generators (PRG), such as resilience, forward security, backward security and
recovering security. In particular, the latter was recently proposed as a measure to recover the internal state
of a PRG [41]. We propose a PRG that uses our source of strong entropy and implements a refresh function
to increase its resilience and recovery capability. The pseudo-random generator has the following property:
Robust PRG - Every value nprd returned by the function PRG_next is indistinguishable-from-random.
A robust PRG needs three well-defined constructions, namely setup(), refresh() (or re-seed), and next(),
as described in Algorithm 2. The internal state of our PRG is represented by three variables, the 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑, the
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 and the next pseudo-random data 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑. The setup process generates a new seed, by using our
strong source of entropy, which is used to update the internal state. In line 3, we initialize the 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
by calling the 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 function, which returns a long unsigned int value that will be used to re-seed
and to generate the next pseudorandom value. In line 4, we call 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 to make sure that the
external entropy gets updated before calling one more time the 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑔𝑒𝑡 function. The first 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 is the
outcome of an XOR operation between the newly generated seed and a second call to our source of entropy.
It is worth emphasizing that the set up of the initial state of the PRG does not require any intervention
or interaction with the end user. We provide strong and reliable entropy to set up the initial values of all
three variables. This ensures that our PRG is non-sensitive to the initial state. For instance, in a tradicional
PRG the user could provide an initial seed, or other setup values, that could compromise the quality of the
generator’s output. The 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, which is concatenated with the 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 (lines 9 and 13), gives the idea of an
unbounded state space [120]. This is possible because we are using cryptographically strong primitives such
as a hash function H and the MAC function HMAC. Thus, in theory, we have unbounded state spaces, i.e.,
we can keep concatenating values to the input of these primitives.
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Algorithm 2: Pseudo-random generator
1: PRG_setup()
2: seed ← entropy_get()
3: counter ← long_uint(entropy_get())
4: call entropy_update()
5: nprd ← seed ⊕ entropy_get()
6: PRG_refresh()
7: seed ← entropy_get()
8: counter ← long_uint(entropy_get())
9: nprd ← H(seed ‖ nprd ‖ counter)
10: PRG_next()
11: counter ← counter - 1
12: if counter <= 0 call PRG_refresh()
13: nprd ← HMAC(seed, nprd ‖ counter)
The PRG_refresh() function updates the internal state, i.e., the 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑, the 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 and the 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑. It uses
H to update the state of the 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑. Finally, the PRG_next() function outputs a new, indistinguishable-from-
random stream of bytes, applying HMAC on the internal state. In this function, the 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 is decremented
by one. The idea is for it to start with a very large unsigned 8-bytes value, which is used until it reaches
zero. At this point, the PRG_refresh() function will be called to update the internal state of the generator.
The newly generated 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 is the outcome of an HMAC function with a dimension of 128 bits.
The main motivation for having a PRG along with a strong source of entropy is speed. Studies have shown
that entropy generation can be rather slow, such as 1.5 s to 2min for generating 128 bits of entropy [80].
Our source of entropy uses external entropy and random bytes from special devices, whereas the PRG uses
an HMAC function, in order to have a fast and reliable generation of pseudo-random values.
In spite of the fact that we could use any good PRG to generate cryptographic material (e.g. keys, nonce),
it is worth emphasizing that we introduce a PRG that works in a seamless way with our strong source
of entropy, improving its quality. In Section 6.2, we discuss the specifics of the implementation. We also
evaluate the robustness and level of confidence of our algorithms in Section 7.1. A discussion about the
correctness of Algorithm 2 can be found in Appendix B of [74].
4.4 Integrated device verification value (iDVV)
The design of our logically-centralized security architecture also includes the iDVV component [72]. The iDVV
idea was inspired by the iCVVs (integrated card verification values) used in credit cards to authenticate and
authorize transactions in a secure and inexpensive way. In [72] the concept was applied to SDN, proposing
a flexible method of generating iDVVs that can be safely used to secure communication between any
two devices. As a result, iDVVs can be used to partially address two gaps of non-functional properties,
security-performance and complexity-robustness.
iDVVs are sequentially generated to authenticate and authorize requests between two networking devices,
and/or protect communication. Starting with the same seed and secret, the iDVV generator will generate,
for example, at both ends of a controller-device association, the exact same sequence of values. In other
words, it is a deterministic generator of authentication or authorization codes, or one-time keys, which are,
however, indistinguishable from random. The main advantages of iDVVs are their low cost, which makes
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them usable even on a per-message basis, and the fact that they can be generated off-line, i.e., without
having to establish any previous agreement.
The analysis provided in [72] and in this paper show that iDVVs achieve a high level of confidence and
outperform traditional key generation functions without compromising the security.
4.5 System roles and setup
In our system we assume the existence of personnel with two different roles: the system administrator, that
controls the operation of central services such as anchor, and the network administrator (a.k.a. manager),
responsible for the operation of network devices. Every time a new network device (a forwarding device or a
controller) is added to the network, it must first be registered, before being able to operate.
In the current practice, the device registration is a manual process triggered by a network administrator
through an out-of-band channel. Given the potentially large number of network devices in SDN, such a
manual process is unsatisfactory. Thus, we propose a protocol, described below, to fulfil the desire of a
semi-automated device registration process, which is efficient, secure, and requires the least involvement of
anchor. The anchor is first set up by the system administrator. Next, each network device is set up by
anchor. Before that process, the network administrator has to share a secret key with the device. The set
up of this key and the registration of devices is described in Section 4.6. Then, the devices can be registered
automatically.
Now we present the deployment, communication and set up required for anchor (by the system
administrator), network administrator, and devices. Afterwards, we describe the device registration and
association algorithms.
Deploying Anchor. Currently, anchor is designed to work in a single domain, with single ownership,
such as a data center, enterprise, or university campus network. anchor supports deployments with multiple
controller instances [67], for scalability and availability of network control, as is required in production
systems [58]. It is worth emphasizing it is part of our plan to extend the anchor’s features and services to
multiple domains with multiple ownership.
Connectivity infrastructure. anchor is designed to logically centralize non-functional properties of generic
SDN deployments. As such, it is not restricted to OpenFlow. Other southbound APIs can be used, such as
POF, ForCES, or P4. The anchor connectivity infrastructure, used for communication between SDN devices
(controllers and networking gear) and anchor, can use traditional in-band or out-of-band mechanisms (for
instance, traditional routing protocols such as OSPF or IS-IS, as is common for control plane channels [67]).
For simplicity and without loss of generality, in what follows we denote 𝐸𝑋𝑌 () an encryption using
encryption key 𝐾𝑒𝑋𝑌 , and we denote [],HMAC𝑋𝑌 , respectively, a message field inside [], followed by
an HMAC over the whole material within [], using MAC key 𝐾ℎ𝑋𝑌 , where 𝑋,𝑌 ∈ {𝐴,𝐷𝑖,𝑀,𝐶, 𝐹}, for
ANCHOR, Device, network adM inistrator (or Manager), Controller, and Forwarding device. In what follows,
anchor can generate strong keys using a suitable key derivation function (KDF) based on the high entropy
random material described in the previous sections.
Anchor setup. The anchor needs two master recovery keys, namely the master recovery encryption key
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐 and master recovery MAC key 𝐾ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑐, fundamental for the post-compromise recovery steps described
ahead. However, these two master recovery keys, in possession of the authority overseeing anchor (the
system administrator), must never appear in the anchor server (if they are to recover from a possible full
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server compromise), being securely stored and used only in an offline manner 1. Due to space constraints, we
refer the reader to Appendix C of [74] for more information (including a visual representation) regarding
the three phases of anchor, namely setup, normal operation, and recovery.
As we will present later, the master recovery keys are only used in two cases, namely (a) when a new
network administrator is registered with anchor (i.e. the network administrator setup process); and (b)
when anchor was compromised and is reinstated into a trustworthy state (i.e. the post-compromise recovery
process presented in §4.9). When either case occurs, the anchor authority only needs to use the master
recovery keys once, to recursively compute the recovery keys of all devices and network administrators. The
output of the calculation will be imported into the anchor server through an out-of-band channel (e.g. by
using a USB).
Network administrator setup. Each network administrator (or manager, denoted 𝑀) with identity M_ID
is registered with anchor manually. This is the only manual process to initialize a new 𝑀 . Afterwards, all
devices managed by this M can be registered with anchor through our device registration protocol.
During the network administrator registration phase, anchor locally generates encryption key 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀
and MAC key 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 to be shared with 𝑀 , and they are manually imported into 𝑀 through an out-of-band
channel (again, by using a USB, for example).
Further, 𝑀 recovery keys 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐||M_ID) and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑐||M_ID) are also com-
puted by anchor offline. 𝑀 recovery keys live essentially offline, since 𝑀 needs to perform only infrequent
operations with these keys (e.g. upon device registration). Note that anchor does not store 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 or
𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 as well, but can recompute them offline when the post-compromise recovery process is triggered, as
we detail in Section 4.9.
Device setup. A device with identity 𝐷𝑖 is either a forwarding device (F) or a controller (C), but we do not
differentiate them during the set up and registration processes. The first operation to be made after a device
is first brought to the system is the setup, which, in the context of this paper, concerns the establishment of
credentials, for secure management access by the network administrator.
Upon request from𝑀 , anchor locally generates a pair of keys for each device𝐷𝑖 being set up ,𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 and
𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 , to be respectively the encryption and MAC key to be shared between 𝑀 and 𝐷𝑖, for management.
They are sent to 𝑀 under the protection of 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 . Then, they are manually imported by the
network administrator into each 𝐷𝑖 through an out-of-band channel.
4.6 Device registration
The device registration protocol is presented in Algorithm 3. We assume that 𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 and 𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 , described
above, are in place.
The first part concerns the bootstrap of the registration of a batch of devices with anchor (𝐴), by a
network administrator 𝑀 . Let {𝐷𝑖}𝑛𝑖=1 be the set of 𝑛 device identities that the administrator wants to
register. 𝑀 requests (line 1) the registration to 𝐴, accompanying each 𝐷𝑖 with a nonce 𝑥𝑖𝑚. 𝐴 computes its
own nonce 𝑥𝑖𝑎, and keys 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 , for each 𝐷𝑖, and returns them encrypted to 𝑀 (lines 2,3). The
random nonces 𝑥𝑖𝑚 and 𝑥𝑖𝑎 are used to prevent replay attacks.
1Just to give a real feel, one possible implementation of this principle is: a pristine anchor server image is created; it boots
offline in single user mode; it generates 𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐 and 𝐾ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑐 through a strong KDF as discussed above; keys are written into a
USB device, and then deleted; first online boot proceeds.
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Algorithm 3: Device registration
{Bootstrap for devices 𝐷1 −𝐷𝑛 }
1. M → A [Reg,M_ID, 𝐸𝑀 ({𝐷𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑚}𝑛𝑖=1)], HMAC𝑀
2. A for each 𝐷𝑖, generate 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑖
𝑎
3. A → M [Reg,M_ID, 𝐸𝑀 ({(𝐷𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑚, 𝑥𝑖𝑎, 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 )}𝑛𝑖=1)], HMAC𝑀
{For each device 𝐷𝑖}
4. M 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 ← H(𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 ||𝐷𝑖); 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 ← H(𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 ||𝐷𝑖).
5. M → 𝐷𝑖 [Reg, 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑎, 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 )],
HMAC𝑀𝐷𝑖
6. 𝐷𝑖 → A [M_ID, 𝐷𝑖, 𝐸𝐷𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑎)], HMAC𝐷𝑖
7. A → M [M_ID, 𝐷𝑖, 𝐸𝑀 (𝑥𝑖𝑎)], HMAC𝑀
8. A tag(𝐷𝑖) = registered;
9. for 𝑡 ∈ {𝐶, 𝐹}, if Type(𝐷𝑖)==t, then 𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∪ {𝐷𝑖}
10. ∀𝑖 ∈ 1, 𝑛, if tag(𝐷𝑖) == registered is True
11. 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 ); 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 ).
12. M → 𝐷𝑖 [𝐷𝑖, 𝐸𝑀𝐷𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑎)], HMAC𝑀𝐷𝑖
13. M tag(𝐷𝑖) = registered;
14. destroys (𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑟𝐴𝐷𝑖 );
15. 𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 ); 𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 );
16. ∀𝑖 ∈ 1, 𝑛, if tag(𝐷𝑖) == registered is True
17. 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 ); 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 ).
18. 𝐷𝑖 𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 ); 𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 ).
The process then follows for each device 𝐷𝑖. First, the device recovery key is created (line 4), using 𝑀 ’s
recovery keys 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 . Then 𝑀 sends 𝐷𝑖 the relevant cryptographic keys (line 5). Device 𝐷𝑖
follows-up confirmation to 𝐴, which closes the loop with 𝑀 , using the original nonce from 𝐴 (lines 6,7). 𝐴
then performs a set of operations (lines 8-11) to commit the registration of 𝐷𝑖, namely by inserting it into
the controller or forwarding device list, respectively CList or FList, and updating several keys.
Note that in Algorithm 3, the update of several shared keys (i.e., lines 11, 15, 17, 18) at the end of the
registration steps at 𝐴, 𝑀 , and 𝐷𝑖, is used to provide PFS. When a key is updated, the old one is destroyed.
Continuing, in line 12 𝑀 closes the loop with 𝐷𝑖, using the original nonce from 𝐴, finally confirming 𝐷𝑖’s
registration. Upon this step, both 𝑀 and 𝐷𝑖 perform the key update just mentioned.
Note that the generation process of the recovery keys 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 lies with 𝑀 (line 4), though
using its recovery keys shared with anchor, 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 . This reduces the number of uses of the
master recovery key. However, as we will see, albeit not knowing 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 , and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 ,
anchor can easily compute them offline, if needed. Second, 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 possessed by the network
administrator are only used when new devices need to be registered. So, 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 can be usually
stored offline. This provides an extra layer of security.
4.7 Device association
The association service is required for authorizing control plane channels between any two devices, such as a
forwarding device and a controller. A forwarding device has to request an association with a controller it
wishes to communicate with. This association is mediated by the anchor.
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The association process between two devices is performed by the sequence of steps detailed in Algorithm 4.
Registered controllers and forwarding devices are inserted in CList and FList, respectively. Notation: As
explained above, the registration process set in place shared secret keys between anchor (A) and any
controller C or forwarding device F.
Algorithm 4: Device association
{Of forwarding device 𝐹 with controller 𝐶}
1. F → A [𝑥𝑔 , F, GetCList],HMAC𝐹
2. A → F [𝑥𝑔 , F, 𝐸𝐹 (CList(F), 𝑥𝑔)],HMAC𝐹
3. F → C 𝑥𝑔 , GetAiD, F, C, 𝐸𝐹 (GetAiD, F, C, 𝑥𝑓 , 𝑥𝑔)
4. C → A [𝑥𝑔 , GetAiD, F, C, 𝐸𝐹 (GetAiD, F, C, 𝑥𝑓 , 𝑥𝑔),
𝐸𝐶(GetAiD, F, C, 𝑥𝑐, 𝑥𝑔)],HMAC𝐶
5. A → C [𝑥𝑔 , 𝐸𝐹 (𝑥𝑓 , AiD), 𝐸𝐶(𝑥𝑐, AiD)],HMAC𝐶
6. A destroys (𝐴𝑖𝐷)
7. C → F 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐸𝐹 (𝑥𝑓 , AiD), 𝐸𝐴𝑖𝐷(SEED, 𝑥𝑔)
8. F → C 𝑥𝑔 , 𝐸𝐴𝑖𝐷(SEED ⊕ 𝑥𝑔)
9. A, F 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐹 = H(𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐹 ); 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐹 = H(𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐹 )
10. A, C 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐶 = H(𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐶); 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐶 = H(𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐶)
The device association implemented by Algorithm 4 has the following properties:
Controller Authorization - Any device F can only associate to a controller C authorized by the anchor.
Device Authorization - Any device F can associate to some controller, only if F is authorized by the
anchor.
Association ID Secrecy - After termination of the algorithm, the association ID (𝐴𝑖𝐷) is only known to F
and C.
Seed Secrecy - After termination of the algorithm, the seed (𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷) is only known to F and C.
The algorithm coarse structure follows the line of the Needham-Schroeder (NS) original authentication
and key distribution algorithm [89], but contemplates anti-replay measures such as including participant
IDs, and a global initial nonce as suggested in [95]. Unlike NS, it uses encrypt-then-mac to further prevent
impersonation. Furthermore, it is specialized for device association, managing authorization lists, and
distributing a double secret in the end (association ID and seed). Secure communication protocols running
after association can, as explained below in Section 4.8, use iDVVs on a key-per-message or key-per-session
basis, rolling from the initial seed and secret association ID.
The association process starts with a forwarding device (F) sending an association request to the anchor
(A) (line 1 in Algorithm 4). This request contains a nonce 𝑥𝑔, the identification of the device and the
operation request 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 (get list of controllers). The request also contains an HMAC to avoid device
impersonation attacks. The anchor checks if F is in FList (registered devices), and if so, it replies (line 2)
with a list of controllers (CList(F)) which F is authorized to associate with. The list of controllers (and
the nonce 𝑥𝑔) is encrypted using a key (set up during registration) shared between A and F. This protects
the confidentiality of the list of controllers, and 𝑥𝑔 ensures that the message is fresh, providing protection
against replay attacks. A message authentication code also protects the integrity of the anchor’s reply,
avoiding impersonation attacks. Next, F sends an association request to the chosen controller C (line 3). The
request contains a message that is encrypted using a key shared between F and A. This message contains
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the get association id (𝐺𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑖𝐷) request, the identity of the principals involved (F,C), a nonce 𝑥𝑓 , and binds
to the nonce 𝑥𝑔. The controller forwards this message to A (line 4), adding its own encrypted association
request field, similar to F’s, but containing C’s own nonce 𝑥𝑐 instead. This prevents the impersonation of the
controller since only it would be able to encrypt the freshly generated 𝑥𝑔. In line 5, C trusts that A’s reply
is fresh because it contains 𝑥𝑔. The controller also trusts that it is genuine (from A) because it contains 𝑥𝑐.
As such, C endorses F as an authorized device and 𝐴𝑖𝐷 as the association key for F. Future compromise of
A should not represent any threat to established communication between C and F. To achieve this goal, A
immediately destroys the 𝐴𝑖𝐷 (line 6) and C and F further share a seed not known by A (line 7).
C forwards both the encrypted 𝐴𝑖𝐷 message and its seed to F (line 7). The forwarding device trusts
that this message is fresh and correct because it contains 𝑥𝑔, and 𝑥𝑓 under encryption, together with the
𝐴𝑖𝐷, only know to F and C, which it endorses then as the association key. F trusts that C is the correct
correspondent, otherwise A would not have advanced to step 5. That being true, future interactions will
use 𝐴𝑖𝐷. F believes that the 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 is genuine, as random entropy for future interactions, because it is
encapsulated by 𝐴𝑖𝐷, known only to C and F. The forwarding device also trusts that the message is fresh
because it contains 𝑥𝑔 . Finally (line 8), C trusts it is associated with F (as identified in step 3 and confirmed
by A in step 5), when F replies showing it knows both the 𝐴𝑖𝐷 and the 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷, by encrypting the 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷
XOR’ed with the current nonce 𝑥𝑔, with 𝐴𝑖𝐷. Replay and impersonation attacks are avoided because all
encrypted interactions are dependent on nonces, so will become void in the future. At the end of each device
association protocol, all keys shared between a device (F or C) and anchor will be updated to the hash
value of this key (lines 9, 10). Again, this is used to provide perfect forward secrecy. All nonces are random,
i.e., not predictable.
A discussion of the correctness of Algorithm 4 can be found in Appendix D of [74].
4.8 Device-to-device communication
Communication between any two devices happens only after a successful association. Consider the end of an
association establishment, as per Algorithm 4, e.g. between a controller C and a forwarding device F: at this
point, both sides, and only them, have the secret and unique material 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷,𝐴𝑖𝐷. Using them, they can
bootstrap the iDVV protocol (see Section 4.4 above), which from now on can be used at will by any secure
communication primitives. As explained earlier, and detailed in [72], iDVV generation is flexible and low
cost, to allow the use: (a) on a per message basis; (b) for a sequence of messages; (c) for a specific interval of
time; or (d) for one communication session.
NaCl [18], as mentioned in previous sections, is a simple, efficient, and secure alternative to OpenSSL-like
implementations, and is thus our choice for secure communication amongst devices.
4.9 Post-compromise recovery
As previously explained, when anchor is reinstated after a compromise, it is crucial to have a way to
automatically re-establish the secure communication channels between anchor and all participants.
Algorithm 5 presents our solution to re-establish the secure communication channels when anchor is
compromised. Intuitively, since anchor’s master recovery keys 𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐 and 𝐾ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑐 are stored securely offline,
they are unknown to an attacker who has stolen all secrets from the anchor server. As described before, all
𝑀 and all 𝐷𝑖 recovery keys can be recursively computed from the master keys, offline (line 1). Afterwards,
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the system administrator imports those keys into the anchor server. To continue the recovery process,
anchor generates new random keys to be shared with all 𝑀s, and all 𝐷𝑖 (line 2).
Then, anchor sends to each 𝑀 (line 3) a recovery message to re-share keys (contained in 𝑀𝑘) with the
devices under the network administrator’s control. The messages are encrypted with the corresponding
recovery keys. The new shared keys will be used to protect future communications. Note that in line 3
we create an additional MAC value on the entire message under the current MAC key 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 . Since the
recovery keys are stored offline, without having this additional MAC value the network administrator would
have to perform the verification offline, manually. This MAC value prevents possible DoS attacks where an
attacker creates and sends fake recovery messages to network managers, as this additional MAC value can
be verified online efficiently.
Each 𝑀 implements the recovery operation with each of the devices it manages (line 4). The new keys
replace the possibly compromised keys at 𝑀 and each 𝐷𝑖 (lines 5-6, and 9). Likewise, when the recovery
process has been completed, the recovery keys will be updated to their hash value (lines 7-8, and 10-11). As
mentioned previously, this key update is used to provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
Algorithm 5: anchor recovery.
{For each manager 𝑀 and its associated devices {𝐷𝑖}𝑛𝑖=1}}
1. A computes 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 and 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 ;
2. generates 𝑀𝑘 = 𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝑀 , 𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝑀 , {𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
}𝑛𝑖=1.
3. A → M Recovery,A, M_ID, 𝐸𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑘,HMAC𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 ,HMAC𝑀 .
{For each device 𝐷𝑖}
4. M → 𝐷𝑖 Recovery,A, M_ID, 𝐷𝑖, 𝐸𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖𝐾𝑒
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
, 𝐾ℎ′𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,HMAC𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,HMAC𝑀𝐷𝑖 .
5. M destroys 𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝐷𝑖 , 𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
;
6. 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝑀 = 𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝑀 ; 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝑀 = 𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝑀 ;
7. 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 = H(𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 ); 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 = 𝐻𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 );
8. 𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 ); 𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 ).
9. 𝐷𝑖 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 = 𝐾𝑒
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
; 𝐾ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 = 𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
;
10. 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 ); 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 );
11. 𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑖 ); 𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 = H(𝐾ℎ𝑀𝐷𝑖 ).
If the keys of the network administrator 𝑀 get compromised (e.g., if 𝑀 loses its keys), they can be
recovered using the recovery keys provided by 𝐴. Moreover, 𝑀 can also re-establish its shared secrets
with anchor and its devices in a similar way as described in Algorithm 5. However, the steps are made
only for a single 𝑀 instead of all 𝑀 , and with some differences, which we detail next. First, 𝑀 gets the
recovery keys (line 1) from anchor through an out-of-band channel: 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑀 , 𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝑀 , and all 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,
𝐾𝑟ℎ𝐴𝐷𝑖 from 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛. Then, in lines 2-3, 𝑀 will get (generated by 𝐴) the 𝐾𝑒
′
𝑀𝐷𝑖
,𝐾ℎ′𝑀𝐷𝑖 keys for
managing all devices, instead of 𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
, which do not need to be changed. Finally, in line 4 keys
𝐾𝑒′𝑀𝐷𝑖 ,𝐾ℎ
′
𝑀𝐷𝑖
are sent to each 𝐷𝑖, instead of 𝐾𝑒′𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,𝐾ℎ
′
𝐴𝐷𝑖
.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We provide formal machine-checked verification of the core security properties of anchor, using the
Tamarin prover. In particular, we formalise the core protocols of anchor, including device registration
protocol, device association protocol, and post-compromise recovery protocol, through symbolic modeling.
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In addition, for each of the protocols, we verify its correctness, message confidentiality, and perfect forward
secrecy (PFS). Moreover, we additionally verify the post-compromise security of anchor with the post-
compromise recovery protocol.
The full model contains 1712 lines of code. In total, we have proved 33 properties — 23 of them are helper
lemmas for the theorem prover to understand anchor better; 4 lemmas are sanity proofs which check the
correctness of our protocols and their formalisation; and 6 main security properties that ensure the message
confidentiality, perfect forward secrecy, and post-compromise security of anchor. We provide all input files
and complete formal model required to understand and reproduce our security analysis at [9].
5.1 Security properties
anchor achieves both classical security properties and novel security properties. In a classical sense, the
confidentiality of communications between any two devices is guaranteed. In particular, anchor also provides
perfect forward secrecy, namely if a device is compromised, then all communications of this device in the
past are still secure.
For the novel security guarantee, as mentioned before, rather than assuming the trusted party cannot be
compromised, such as CAs in X.509 PKI or the KDC in Kerberos, we also consider that anchor might be
compromised. In this case, we assume that there are means to detect that the compromise has happened,
and then the system can be recovered through our post-compromise recovery protocol, which also guarantees
perfect forward security, when anchor is compromised and recovered.
5.2 Formal analysis
We analyse the main security properties of the protocol using the Tamarin prover [85]. The Tamarin prover
is a symbolic analysis tool that can prove properties of security protocols for an unbounded number of
instances and supports reasoning about protocols with mutable global state, which makes it suitable for our
protocols. Protocols are specified using multiset rewriting rules, and properties are expressed in a guarded
fragment of first order logic that allows quantification over timepoints.
Tamarin is capable of automatic verification in many cases, and it also supports interactive verification by
manual traversal of the proof tree. If the tool terminates without finding a proof, it returns a counter-example.
Counter-examples are given as so-called dependency graphs, which are partially ordered sets of rule instances
that represent a set of executions that violate the property. Counter-examples can then be used to refine the
model, and give feedback to the implementer and designer.
5.3 Modeling aspects
As explained, we consider four protocol roles in anchor, namely A (anchor), M (network Manager), F
(Forwarding device), and C (Controller). To simplify our model, we consider an additional role D (Device)
to represent any kind of network device, when it is irrelevant to distinguish its type (i.e., F or C).
We model the above protocol roles by a set of rewrite rules. Our modeling of the roles follows the typical
Tamarin models, and directly corresponds to the algorithm descriptions in the previous sections. Specifically,
each rewrite rule typically models receiving a message, taking an appropriate action, and sending a response
message. Tamarin provides built-in support for a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, i.e., one who is in full
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control of the network. We also specify rules that enable the attacker to compromise anchor and/or any
device in the network, and learn all of their session keys.
5.4 Proof goals
We state several proof goals as specified in Tamarin’s syntax. Since Tamarin’s property specification
language is a fragment of first-order logic, it contains logical connectives (|, &, ==>, not, ...) and quantifiers
(All, Ex). In Tamarin, proof goals are marked as lemma. The #-prefix is used to denote timepoints, and “E
@ #i” expresses that the event 𝐸 occurs at timepoint 𝑖. Due to the space limitation, we only present a set of
examples selected from our full model, to explain the core ideas. We refer the reader to the full model and
detailed proof results available at [9].
The first example goal is a check for executability that ensures that our model allows for the successful
transmission of a message. The following example, which is a correctness lemma in the device registration
protocol, shows how it is encoded in our proof.
lemma protocol_correctness [use_induction]:
exists-trace
"Ex A D Did k keAD #i1.
SendSec(A, D, Did,k, keAD) @ i1"
The property holds if the Tamarin model exhibits a behaviour in which a device D of any type with
unique identity Did can successfully exchange with anchor A a message k encrypted by using a secret
keAD shared between D and A. This property mainly serves as a sanity check on the model. If it does not
hold, it would mean our model does not model the normal message flow, which could indicate a flaw in
the model. Tamarin automatically proves this property and generates the expected trace in the form of a
graphical representation of the rule instantiations and the message flow. We additionally proved several
other sanity-checking properties to minimize the risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is the core secrecy property with respect to a classical attacker. When a controller
C is associated with a forwarding device F, then the following expresses that unless the attacker compromises
either C or F, he cannot learn any messages exchanged between them. Note that K(m) is a special event
that denotes that the attacker knows 𝑚 at this time.
lemma message_secrecy [use_induction]:
"All C F Did1 Did2 k seed #i.
/* If a message k is exchanged */
( SendSec(C, F, Did1, Did2, k, seed) @ #i &
/* without the adversary compromising any device */
not (Ex #j.
Compromise_Device(C, F, Did1, Did2, seed) @ #j)
) ==>
/* then the adversary cannot know k */
not ( Ex #j. K(k) @ #j) "
Tamarin also proves this property automatically. The above result implies that if a forwarding device F
with identity Did1 and a controller C with identity Did2 has exchanged a message k encrypted under a
shared seed, and the attacker did not compromise any device at any time, then the attacker will not learn k.
Similarly, the following example expresses the PFS for the communications between two devices.
lemma message_forward_secrecy [use_induction]:
"All C F Did1 Did2 k seed #i.
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( SendSec(C, F, Did1, Did2, k, seed) @ #i &
not (Ex #j seed2.
Compromise_Device(C, F, Did1, Did2, seed2) @ j &
j<i)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know k */
not ( Ex #j. K(k) @ #j)
)
"
Tamarin proves this property automatically, and the result additionally implies that the message is secure
if the attacker did not compromise any device before the current communication session.
The final example property encodes the post-compromise security guarantees provided by anchor. In this
example, if anchor was compromised, and then recovered through our protocol, then the confidentiality of
communications between anchor and forwarding device F is guaranteed.
lemma message_secrecy_after_recovery [use_induction]:
"All A M F C Did k enckey #i1 #i2 #i3.
(Comppromised_A(A) @#i1 &
Recovery_Done(A,M,F,C)@ #i2 & i1<i2 &
SendSec(A, F, Did, k, enckey) @ #i3 & i2<i3)
==>
/* then the adversary cannot know k */
not ( Ex #i4. K(k) @ #i4)
"
The property states that if anchor was compromised at session 𝑖1, and the recovery action has been
completed afterwards at session 𝑖2, then the confidentiality of message k exchanged in a later time between
A and forwarding device F is guaranteed.
The above properties are all proven automatically by the Tamarin prover on a PC2 within 15min.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
A prototype of anchor has been implemented as envisioned in Figure 2. To strengthen our confidence in
the effectiveness of deployment of anchor in a production environment, we have implemented two versions
of the system. The first uses the POX controller and CBench3 (OpenFlow switches emulator). This version
has approximately 2k lines of Python code and 700 lines of C code (integration with CBench). It uses
Google’s protobuf (https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/) for defining the protocols and efficiently
serializing the data. The second is a slightly simplified version using the Ryu controller and Open vSwitch.
In this section, we give an overview of the most relevant implementation details. The evaluation of the
different components of the architecture is presented in Section 7.
6.1 Source of strong entropy
We have 32 pools of events fed by four different sources, (1) incoming packet rate sent by controllers; (2)
incoming packet rate of anchor; (3) network statistics of forwarding devices; and (4) random bytes from
local systems. Each of the sources feeds the pools in its own way. Sources (1) and (3) use a round-robin
2Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz, 16GB memory.
3CBench is the default and most widely used tool for benchmarking control plane performance [62, 137].
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approach, whereas sources (2) and (4) randomly select the next pool to put the new event in. In this way,
we have a diversity of approaches for feeding the pools of noise, making the “guessing task” of an attacker
harder. Each pool needs to store only the digest of the SHA512 hashing function. The current digest and
the newly arrived events are used as input of the hashing function. Lastly, once the pool has been used by
the source of strong entropy, it is reset to a new initial state, which consists of the digest of a hash function
using as input random bytes of a local entropy source such as /dev/urandom.
To implement the entropy_update() function (see Algorithm 1), we can use the pools of noise circularly
(e.g., 𝑃0 and 𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3, and so forth), in a combined circular and random way (𝑃0 and 𝑃7, 𝑃1 and 𝑃31,
and so forth), or in a completely random fashion. The number of pools (32) and this diversity of approaches
for using the pools make it very hard for an attacker to enumerate the possible values for the events used to
update the generator’s internal state [46].
Even if an attacker is controlling two or more external sources in a timely manner, it will be hard to
guess the new state of the external entropy. First, the attacker needs to enumerate the events of the pools
being used on each update. This, by itself, is something hard to achieve since the attacker does not know
the update sequence of these pools, i.e., which external sources are being used, in which sequence, to update
each pool. In other words, he/she would have to know all sources of noise, and the sequence in which they
are being used to update the pools. It is also worth emphasizing that the external sources need to have
a pre-defined maximum rate for sending the heartbeats, i.e., compromised sources cannot send data at a
higher frequency to influence subsequent updates of the external entropy. Second, the attacker would need
to have additional knowledge regarding the internal entropy.
6.2 Pseudorandom generator (PRG)
Our PRG combines the implementation strengths of different solutions such as the PRF of SPINS [97]
(which is based on an HMAC function), provably secure constructions for building robust PRGs [41, 46],
and unbounded state spaces through cryptographic primitives [120].
As HASH function we have chosen SHA512. As HMAC function, we have chosen the one time authentication
function crypto_onetimeauth() from NaCl [18]. This function ensures security and performance while
generating outputs of 16 bytes that are indistinguishable from random.
PRG at the devices. As the controllers and forwarding devices do not have a source of strong entropy,
we implemented a slightly modified version of the algorithm for these components to use this logically-
centralized security service provided by the anchor. Essentially, we replace the entropy_get() function by
entropy_remote(). Instead of using local data, this function makes an entropy request to the anchor to
obtain a source of strong entropy. This function is essential to provide recovering security by refreshing,
improving the resilience of the PRG.
6.3 Secure cryptographic key generators
Based on the algorithm proposed in [72], we have implemented an iDVV-based secure cryptographic
keys generator that supports seven different cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we use each of these
primitives as input to the idvv_next(primitive_id) function that is used to generate the next key. In our
implementation, we used the following primitives: MD5, SHA1, SHA512, SHA256, poly1305aes_ authenticate,
crypto_onetimeauth, and crypto_hash. While the first four functions are provided by OpenSSL, the last
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three are provided by an independent implementation of Poly1305-AES and NaCl. As MD5 and SHA1 are
deprecated, we use them only for performance comparison purposes.
To understand the rationale for our implementation, we give a bit of context to clarify the difference
between our solution and traditional key derivation functions (KDFs). Both solutions are used to generate
secure cryptographic keys that can resist different types of attacks, such as exhaustive key search attacks [130].
KDFs have common design characteristics, such as strong hash functions to compute digests for the raw key
material. A secure KDF can be defined as 𝐻𝑐(𝑝||𝑠||𝑐) [130]. 𝐻 is a strong hash function such as SHA256
or SHA512. The exponent 𝑐 represents the number of iterations used to make the task of the attackers
harder. A common value for 𝑐 is 216. This exponent is particularly necessary if the entropy of the input 𝑝
(e.g., password, seed, key) is unknown. In practice, the input of the KDF is likely to be of low-entropy [130].
While in some use cases a high exponent 𝑐 might be necessary to increase the cost of an attack trying to
recover the key, it also significantly increases the cost of the key derivation function for high performance
latency-sensitive applications.
Differently from a traditional key derivation scheme, our implementation using the iDVV generator in the
context of anchor uses high-entropy values. In other words, we do not need to recur to the exponent 𝑐 as a
means to compensate a potentially low-entropy 𝑝. By using by default two 32 bytes indistinguishable-from-
random values in our generator, we make the task of an attacker very hard. It is also worth mentioning that
iDVVs are essentially used in an association basis, i.e., they have a relatively short lifetime.
6.4 Implementation using Ryu and Open vSwitch
We have implemented a second, simplified version of the system, focused on the essential registration and
authorization functions of anchor. We have used the Ryu controller [108] for the control plane, and Open
vSwitch (OVS) (https://www.openvswitch.org/) for the data plane. Ryu fully supports all versions of
OpenFlow, including Nicira Extensions, and is officially integrated into OpenStack Networking (Neutron).
OVS is the main software switch used in virtualized data centers (e.g. VMWare NSX [125], OpenStack [122],
OpenShift [106]). In addition, physical switches such as the Pica8 family [98] rely on PicOS [99], a user-space
application running on top of an unmodified Linux kernel, providing OpenFlow support (version 1.0 to 1.4)
through integration with standard Open vSwitch. This second implementation further strengthens our case
for the effectiveness of deployment of anchor in production SDN systems that include both software and
hardware data planes.
We modified Open vSwitch (v2.10.0) and Ryu (v4.28) to support the registration and association
functions provided by anchor. To evaluate our solution on a realistic scenario, using the Mininet emulator
(https://github.com/mininet/mininet) [13, 39, 47, 61, 75, 127, 129] (further details in Section 7.4), we modified
the behavior of the core hub module (ryu/lib/hub.py) of Ryu. Similarly, we changed the behavior of the
communication stack (ovs/lib/stream) of OVS. Specifically, instead of just opening a new communication
channel with the controller, our modified OVS registers itself with anchor (having obtained the network
administrator’s authorization), and sends an association request to the controller. In Section 7.4 we present
the results of anchor providing network protection against a rogue switch that is added to the network by
an attacker, as an example use case.
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7 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the essential security mechanisms and services of our architecture.
For the performance measurements, we used machines with two quad-core Intel Xeon E5620 2.4GHz,
with 2x4x256KB L2 / 2x12MB L3 cache, 32GB SDIMM at 1066MHz, with hyper-threading enabled. These
machines were interconnected by a Gigabit Ethernet switch and ran Ubuntu Server 14.04 LTS.
7.1 Source of entropy and PRGs
We empirically evaluate both the source of strong entropy and PRGs through statistical methods and tools,
following state of the art recommendations [14]. To achieve our goal, we used NIST’s test suite [90]. We
generated one file containing 50MB of random bits per generator. These files were used as input for the
test suite tool STS [90]. In the end, our generators passed the absolute majority of tests and sub-tests: they
failed only 2 sub-tests out of 188 (passed 146 out of 148 non-overlapping template matching), as summarized
in Table 2. This gives a very high level of confidence to our generators.
Table 2. STS: results of the single tests
Test Result
Frequency ✓
Block Frequency ✓
Cumulative Sums (forward) ✓
Cumulative Sums (backward) ✓
Runs ✓
Longest Run of Ones ✓
Binary Matrix Rank ✓
Discrete Fourier Transform ✓
Test Result
Non-overlapping Template Matching 146/148
Approximate Entropy ✓
Random Excursions 8/8
Random Excursions Variant 18/18
Serial (first) ✓
Serial (second) ✓
Linear Complexity ✓
# of sub-tests passed 186/188
7.2 On the performance of key generation
In this section, we analyse the performance of our key generator, which is essential to provide low latency
and high throughput control plane communication at a low cost.
Figure 3a shows the latency of the seven cryptographic primitives we used with our generator. We tested
each primitive by generating keys of different sizes (16, 32, 64, and 128 bytes). The best performance is
achieved by the implementations based on SHA1 and MD5, as expected. However, these two implementations
have also the worst serial correlation coefficient, as shown in [72]. The generators that use SHA512 or
Poly-OTP have good performance, achieving a good security-performance tradeoff.
7.3 Device-to-device communication performance
Connection establishment.While a TLS connection takes around 19ms to be established, a device association
using the anchor takes less than 0.06ms. This means that anchor can easily support large-scale data
centers (e.g., 1k switches and 100k hosts [5, 15, 49]) while being orders of magnitude more efficient than
traditional solutions for this particular metric. The scale of the improvement of our connection setup process
when compared to the TLS handshake is due to three main factors. First, our algorithm has half the number
of steps. Second, we use symmetric cryptography only. Third, we use the fast ciphering provided by NaCl.
Manuscript accepted for publication in ACM TOPS
26 Kreutz, D. et al
 0
 0.0005
 0.001
 0.0015
 0.002
 0.0025
 0.003
 0.0035
CRYPTO-H SHA512 SHA256 POLY-OTP SHA1 MD5
T
i
m
e
 
(
i
n
 
m
s
)
 
Latency to generate one key
128B
64B
32B
16B
(a) Latency of different key generators
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
2 4 8 16 32 64 128
* *
A
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
l
a
t
e
n
c
y
 
(
s
)
Number of forwarding devices
TCP-ONLY
TCP-ANCHOR-MAC
TCP-ANCHOR-EMAC
OpenSSL-AES256
(b) Control plane communication costs
Fig. 3. Performance of key generation and control plane communications
Communications overhead. Figure 3b shows the results of control plane communications using OpenSSL,
TCP, and two versions of ANCHOR. For communication of up to 128 forwarding devices, sending 10k
control messages each, our solution requires (while offering stronger security guarantees - see below) only
half of the resources and time of an OpenSSL-based implementation using AES256-SHA, the most widely
available cipher suite.
In Figure 3b, we can also observe the overhead of confidentiality (TCP-ANCHOR-EMAC). In contrast
to providing only authenticity and integrity (TCP-ANCHOR-MAC), confidentiality incurs an overhead of
around 15%.
It is worth emphasizing that we achieved these results by ensuring also much stronger security, as we
generated one secret key per packet. On the other hand, the OpenSSL-based implementation used a single
key (for the symmetric ciphering) for the entire communication session.
7.4 Attack prevention
A type of attack that is recurrently presented as an important security threat in the context of SDN is the
introduction, by an attacker, of rogue switches in the network (see [10, 32, 34, 59, 71, 77]). A set of switches
under control of an attacker can be used for a DDoS attack, for instance, negatively affecting SDN control.
We use this type of attack as an example use case that shows the logical centralization of security services in
anchor to enable attack prevention. The defence against this type of attack consists of a switch having
to register itself to anchor before being able to associate with the controller. If either the registration or
association process fails, the switch connection with the controller is automatically dropped.
To demonstrate this functionality, we set up an experiment using the second version of our system (the
one with OVS and Ryu as the data and control planes, respectively). We emulated a small network with
Mininet, comprised of five switches (s0 to s4) and five hosts (h0 to h4), following a tree topology with s0 at
the root. Each network host is connected to one switch (e.g., host h4 is connected to switch s4). To emulate
the attack, we assumed s2 to be a rogue device introduced to the network by an attacker. As the network
manager has not registered s2 into the system, this switch should not be able to associate itself with the
controller. As a result, host h2 should not be reachable by any other host, and vice-versa.
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The outcome of the experiment was as follows. Once the mininet network was up and running, we have
run the pingall command to verify the reachability of all hosts. We observed an overall packet loss of 40% –
the result of 1 out of 5 unreachable hosts (h2, in this case). Each host executes a reachability test for all
other four hosts. However, the reachability test for host h2 fails. In case of h2, all reachability tests fail. In a
closer inspection, we verified that while the simulation was running, switch s2 periodically tried to associate
itself with Ryu, without success, as expected.
7.5 Traditional solutions 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 ANCHOR
In Table 3 we provide a summarised comparison between a traditional solution and our anchor. As traditional
solutions we considered the EJBCA (http://www.ejbca.org/) and OpenSSL, two popular implementations
of PKI and TLS, respectively. As we have shown before, our bootstrap process (device registration and
association) is much faster and our connection latency is also significantly lower. In addition, our solution
has nearly one order of magnitude less LOC and uses four times fewer external libraries. This makes a
difference from a resilience perspective. For instance, to formally prove more than 717k LOC (EJBCA +
OpenSSL) is by itself a tremendous challenge. Moreover, it gets considerably worse if we take into account
eighty external libraries and eleven programming languages.
Table 3. Traditional solutions 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 anchor
Functionality Traditional solutions Anchor
Typical Software EJBCA (PKI) + OpenSSL (TLS) anchor + iDVV + NaCl
Device Identifica-
tion
based on certificates; costs = issue a certifi-
cate
based on unique IDs controlled by the anchor;
costs = register the device (assign a unique
ID)
Device Registration based on certificates; costs = certificate in-
stallation + security control policy/service
registration protocol; costs = register the de-
vice + iDVV bootstrap
Device Association
& KeyGen
12 step mutual handshake + DH for session
keys (incl. certificate validation - any two de-
vice can establish an association)
6 step trust establishment with anchor +
iDVVs per message, session, interval of time,
... (anchor has to authorize association)
Security Properties
Authenticity ✓ ✓
Integrity ✓ ✓
Confidentiality ✓ ✓
PFS ✓(*) ✓
PCS ✗ ✓
PQS ✗ ✓
Communications symmetric cryptography (cipher: AES256-
SHA)
symmetric cryptography (cipher: Salsa20)
TLS stack highly configurable and complex (717k LOC) easy to use, simple (85k LOC), and efficient
Our proposed architecture offers a functionally equivalent level of security with respect to properties
such as authenticity, integrity and confidentiality, when compared to traditional alternatives. Additionally,
anchor offers a higher level of security by providing post-compromise security (PCS) and post-quantum
security (PQS). While the former is ensured through post-compromise recovery (see Section 4.9), the latter is
a consequence of using only symmetric cryptography. Further, the lightweight nature of our mechanisms, such
as the iDVV, make them amenable to be used on a per message basis to secure communication, increasing
cryptographic robustness. Moreover, by having fewer LOC, we significantly reduce the threat surface.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the perfect forward secrecy (*) of traditional solutions, such as those
provided by the different implementations of TLS, is not easy or simple to enforce. First, in spite of TLS
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providing ciphers that offer PFS, in practice, different cipher suites do not feature it [115]. This means
that not all implementations and deployments of TLS offer PFS, or provide it with very low encryption
grade [40, 56, 87]. To give an example, widely deployed web servers, such as Apache and Nginx [40] and
most DHE- and ECDHE-enabled servers suffer from weak PFS configurations [2, 56, 119].
8 RELATED WORK ON SDN SECURITY
Related work on SDN security (see [37, 70, 112, 132] for broad surveys) focuses on securing specific
components of the architecture. As many attacks exploit vulnerabilities of the control plane, the security of
the controller and the applications running on top of it have deserved good attention. In a nutshell, solutions
such as SANE [31], Ethane [30], FortNOX [101], SE-Floodlight [102], FRESCO [116], FLOWGUARD [55],
are specialized applications that run on top of (or as) controllers. The main goal of such solutions is to
provide some security enforcement in the data plane through security services that run on the control
plane. For instance, FLOWGUARD [55] allows users to build robust firewalls, by means of a comprehensive
framework, to protect OpenFlow-based networks. Those firewalls generate OpenFlow flow rules to be
installed in forwarding devices, protecting devices and network services against different security threats.
As another example, the controller Rosemary [117] implements a network application containment and
resilience strategy that addresses the problem of malicious applications leading to loss of network control.
Similarly, FortNOX [101], a software extension for the NOX controller, is robust to adversarial applications
by providing role-based authorization and security constraint enforcement.
These works address different security issues, and they all focus on the functional aspects: i.e., on installing
the appropriate OpenFlow rules in the data plane to achieve their goals. In contrast, we propose the logical
centralization of non-functional properties, with focus on infrastructure security in this paper. As such,
anchor should be seen as: (i) complementary to these solutions; and (ii) in fact, providing overarching
properties which can, amongst other things, assist in the robust implementation of some of the proposed
services. For instance, Rosemary requires a PKI infrastructure for application authorisation that could be
replaced by anchor, inheriting its advantages.
Another line of work in SDN security is devoted to DoS/DDoS attack detection and prevention. As
an example, the use of lightweight information hiding based authentication (by means of secrecy through
obscurity) has been proposed as one way of protecting SDN controllers from this type of attack [1]. The idea
is to use a specific field in the IP protocol to hide the switch authentication ID. In order for the scheme to
be workable, it is assumed that a look-up table and unique IDs are shared among devices through existing
key distribution protocols. Again, this point solution could take advantage of anchor for this purpose.
Interestingly, not much attention has been paid to the security of control plane associations and communi-
cation between devices, one of the aspects we address in this paper. While TLS is the solution recommended
by ONF, recent research discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this protocol as a means to provide
authenticated and encrypted control channels [109], which is aligned with many of the arguments we make
here. As we explained, while the use of TLS gives important security properties, it has an impact on control
plane performance. Additionally, the complexity of the infrastructure software has been recurrently pointed
out as one of the main causes for a high number of reported vulnerabilities, that in many cases have led
to security attacks [54, 82, 83, 139]. As we argue in this paper, by logically-centralizing crucial security
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mechanisms, anchor removes complexity from both controllers and switches, enhancing the robustness of
the infrastructure, and still achieving a gain in performance.
Finally, to protect control plane communications between controllers and forwarding devices our solution
makes use of two existing mechanisms: iDVV [72, 73], as a secure and low-cost method for generation of
authentication codes, and NaCl [18], as a robust alternative to OpenSSL. We apply these solutions to SDN,
but given their standalone nature they can be applied to different scenarios.
To our knowledge, an architectural approach as the one we propose here (which ultimately led to following
the SDN philosophy of “logical centralization”) was lacking. Importantly, this approach allowed us to gain a
global perspective of the relevant gaps in SDN and the limitations of existing solutions to the problem. This
first step gave insight into one of the most relevant problems of SDN (as noted by the ONF or MEF security
groups [84, 92]): the security of the associations and communications between devices – which jointly with
the architecture itself, is one of the contributions of our paper.
9 DISCUSSION
We briefly discuss how we filled the gaps identified in Section 3. Incidentally, we also show, in Appendix
E of [74], to which extent these solutions cover eleven of ONF’s security requirements. We conclude the
section with a critique of our choices and results.
9.1 Meeting the challenges
Security 𝑣𝑠 performance? Control channels need to provide high performance (high throughput and low
latency) while keeping the communication secure. However, as it has been shown, security primitives have
a non-negligible impact on performance. To mitigate this problem, we selected appropriate cryptographic
primitives (SHA512), libraries (NaCl), and key generation mechanisms (iDVV) to ensure the security of
control plane communications maintaining high performance. By logically centralizing the fundamental
aspects of these mechanisms in the anchor, the performance overhead introduced in forwarding devices
and controllers is limited, as they require only minimal functionality to ‘hook’ to the anchor instructions.
Complexity 𝑣𝑠 robustness? Traditional implementations of SSL/TLS, such as OpenSSL, have a large,
complex code base, that recurrently leads to vulnerabilities being discovered. Similar problems are observed in
PKI subsystems. It is well know that an effective means to achieve robustness is by reducing complexity. Hence
our choice for the NaCl and iDVV mechanisms to help fill the gap, since they are respectively lightweight
(small code base), efficient, yet secure alternatives to OpenSSL-like implementations. As such, they are a
robust solution to provide authentication and authorisation material for the secure communications protocols
we propose. They are also amenable to verification mechanisms aimed to assure correctness, which are
much harder to employ in very large code bases. Again, the centralization of the non-functional mechanisms
introduced in our solution is the key to reduce complexity of networking devices, improving their robustness.
Global security policies? We have argued that controllers and network devices often employ suboptimal
network authentication and secure communication mechanisms, despite recommendations from ONF and
other such organizations for the opposite. This problem is very similar in nature to the state of affairs
in networking before SDN. In traditional networks, enforcing relatively “simple” policies such as access
control rules [30] or traffic engineering mechanisms [58] was either very hard or even impossible in practice.
Manuscript accepted for publication in ACM TOPS
30 Kreutz, D. et al
Given the current undesirable state of affairs, we believe the same to be true to non-functional properties,
with security as a prominent example. Our logically centralized anchor architecture addresses this gap
by providing a means for making centralized policy rules and the necessary mechanisms to enforce them,
permeating the SDN architecture in a global and coherent way.
Resilient roots-of-trust? We debated that there is a (probably reduced) number of functions which should
not be left to ad-hoc implementations, due to their criticality on system correctness. The list is not closed, but
we hope to have shown that strong sources of entropy and resilient indistinguishable-from-random number
generators are clear examples of difficult-to-get-right mechanisms that benefit from such logically centralized
approach. anchor addresses this issue, by providing the motivation to design and verify careful and resilient
once-and-for-all implementations of such root-of-trust mechanisms, which can then be reinstantiated in
different SDN deployments.
9.2 Devil’s advocate analysis
Doesn’t the logical centralization of non-functional properties create a single point of failure?
The results of this paper already go a long way to improving robustness of a single root-of-trust, compared
to the state of the art: lowering failure probability; mitigating and recovering from the consequences of
failure. The logical next step would be to try and prevent failures in the first place. However, the failure of
a simplex system of reasonable complexity cannot be prevented.
Nevertheless, note that logical centralization is not necessarily physical centralization. And indeed, our
plan for future work (and the way we drafted our architecture paved the way) is to leverage state-of-the-art
security and dependability mechanisms using replication. For instance, to achieve tolerance of Byzantine
faults, we can readily enhance anchor by replication, taking advantage of state machine replication libraries
such as BFT-SMaRt [21], replicating and diversifying components to prevent failure of this logically central
point, with the desired confidence. These concepts have been applied to root-of-trust like configurations
similar to anchor [29, 68, 138]. Furthermore, systems designed with state machine replication in mind can
also handle different types of threats, such as DoS, without compromising the operation of the service [69].
Won’t the natural hardware evolution be by itself enough to reduce the penalty imposed by cryptographic
primitives? The recent reality seems to contradict this assertion – hardware evolution does not seem enough,
for several reasons. First, new hardware architectures can benefit different existing software-based solutions.
For instance, both NaCl and OpenSSL take advantage of hardware-based AES accelerators. Second, and as
is well known, the fixed price of advancements in hardware seems to be coming to an end [57]. This is made
clear by most of the major IT companies, such as Google and Microsoft, to be redesigning existing software
as a response to cope with this problem [79].
Aren’t traditional PKI and TLS implementations enough? Following what is becoming recurrently
advocated by many in the industry and in the security community, we have tried to argue that the
simplicity and size of software and IT infrastructure matters [35, 124]. Higher complexity has been shown
to lead inevitably to an increased likelihood of bugs and security incidents in software. Indeed, different
implementations of PKI and TLS have been recently used as powerful “weapons” for cyber-attacks and
cyber-espionage [25, 103], leading to concerns about their robustness. Contrary to what this argument may
suggest, that does not mean PKI and TLS are “broken”. We believe they remain fundamental to various
IT infrastructures. However, as the main challenges of securing SDN are usually relatively constrained to
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within a network domain, we have come to understand that simpler, domain-specific solutions seem to be
preferable in this environment when compared to complex infrastructures such as the PKI, and large code
bases as OpenSSL.
Wouldn’t the use of out-of-band control channels solve most problems? Out-of-band channels may be useful
in some contexts, but they are not “intrinsically” secure. It is a recurrent mistake to consider physical isolation,
per se, as a form of security. Several studies have indeed argued the opposite: that out-of-band channels
worsen the problem, by making control plane management more complex and less flexible, endangering
control plane communications [42, 81]. We do not take a stance in this discussion, but the fact is that real
incidents, such as NSA sniffing of Google’s cables between data centers [111], seem clear examples that
out-of-band channels are not, per se, enough.
9.3 Other use cases of ANCHOR
Using anchor beyond control plane communications. As already alluded to in Section 8, anchor can be
extended to support other use cases. For instance, one application running on top of the SDN controller
could be required to provide proper credentials to identify itself. Once successfully authenticated, it should
have access to a specific set of system attributes defined by the operator during registration (e.g., read, write,
notify, among other system calls [7, 45]). Towards this goal, different controllers could rely on authentication
and authorization attributes globally enforced by anchor. Another interesting use case for anchor would
be to offer security support for controller clustering. This is a timely problem. To give an example, the
current release of OpenDaylight does not provide encryption or authentication of control messages exchanged
among controller instances [93]. Since each controller instance would need to be registered with anchor,
it would be possible to provide the same security mechanisms and services we grant to the southbound
connection, to ensure security in east-west communication between controllers.
Addressing other non-functional properties of SDN. The design of anchor is generic enough to accommo-
date non-functional properties beyond security, such as dependability or quality of service. With respect
to the former, anchor could help in modularising the problem of replicated control. Specifically, anchor
could be responsible for coordination between controller replicas, for instance by guaranteeing a strongly
consistent view of the network across all instances. Similar to our security use case, the additional modularity
of such design would allow a clean separation of concerns that could simplify the design of the various
components. Recent proposals [26] have indeed started following a similar design choice. anchor could also
provide trusted measurement services for ensuring a certain level of service even in the presence of malicious
forwarding devices. For instance, once a malicious forwarding device were detected [33, 59], anchor could
automatically remove it from the list of legitimate devices, forcing the disconnection of those devices by
the controllers of the network, which would be registered to receive such events. The subsequent topology
updates on the controllers would trigger automatic traffic re-routing to ensure the quality of service of
applications.
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we debated the problem of enforcing non-functional properties in SDN, such as security or
dependability. Re-iterating the successful philosophy behind the inception of SDN itself, we advocate the
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concept of logical centralization of SDN non-functional properties provision, which we materialize in terms
of the blueprint of an architectural framework, anchor.
Taking ‘security’ as a proof-of-concept use case, we have shown the effectiveness of our proposal. We
made a gap analysis of security in SDN and proposed solutions, by populating the anchor middleware with
crucial mechanisms and services to fill those gaps and enhance the security of SDN.
We evaluated the architecture, especially focusing on the security-performance analysis tradeoff, giving
proofs of the algorithms, cryptographic robustness analyses, and experimental performance evaluations. By
resorting to lightweight yet secure primitives, we outperform the most widely used encryption of OpenSSL by
50%, with a higher level of security. Our solution also fulfills eleven of the security requirements recommended
by ONF.
The mechanisms we propose are certainly not the final answer to SDN security problems. That is not
our claim. We however believe, and hope to have justified in the paper, that an architecture that logically
centralizes non-functional properties of an SDN, has the potential to address some of the most preeminent
unsolved problems regarding the robustness of the infrastructure. We thus hope our work to trigger an
important discussion on these fundamental architectural aspects of SDN.
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A A SOURCE OF STRONG ENTROPY
Correctness. We argue about the properties of Algorithm 1, as a source of strong entropy.
Lemma 1. If the initial values of rand_bytes() and H(data) are indistinguishable from random, then the
resulting initial external entropy (e_entropy - line 2) is indistinguishable from random. Then, the initial
internal entropy (i_entropy - line 3) will be also indistinguishable from random.
Proof: Assuming that rand_bytes() uses one of the strongest pools of entropy of an operating system, such
as /dev/urandom, the outcome of this function call will be indistinguishable from random. Assuming that
H is a cryptographically strong hashing function, the output of H(data) will be indistinguishable from
random for every different input data. Consequently, the XOR operation between rand_bytes() and H(data)
will result in an indistinguishable-from-random initial e_entropy. Following, the XOR operation between
rand_bytes() and e_entropy will result in an indistinguishable-from-random initial i_entropy. In other
words, both internal and external entropy are initialized with indistinguishable-from-random values. □
Lemma 2. If 𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗 , and i_entropy are indistinguishable from random, then the updated external entropy
(e_entropy - line 5) will be indistinguishable from random.
Proof: As discussed before, the pools of entropy 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 contain unpredictable events of external sources
of entropy, such as network traffic and idleness of links. Thus, assuming that H is a cryptographically strong
hashing function, then the output of H(𝑃𝑖||𝑃𝑗) will be indistinguishable from random. Lemma 1 shows that the
internal entropy (𝑖_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦) is indistinguishable from random. In consequence, the updated external entropy
(𝑒_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 - line 5), which is the output of an XOR operation between two indistinguishable-from-random
values, will be indistinguishable from random. □
Lemma 3. If the initial value of rand_bytes() is indistinguishable from random, then the resulting internal
entropy (i_entropy - line 7) is indistinguishable from random.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 establishes that the output of 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 is indistinguishable from random.
Additionally, 𝐸_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 is an internal counter not known by external entities. Therefore, assuming that H
is a cryptographically strong hashing function, then 𝑖_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 output by H(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠||𝐸_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) will
be indistinguishable from random. □
Theorem 1. If e_entropy and i_entropy are indistinguishable from random, then the resulting entropy
returned by entropy_get (line 8) will be indistinguishable from random.
Proof: Lemmata 1 and 2 show that the initial and updated external entropy are indistinguishable from
random. Lemma 3 has shown that the internal entropy generated in line 7 is indeed indistinguishable from
random. As a consequence, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦, as the output of an XOR operation between 𝑖_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 and 𝑒_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦
(line 8) will be indistinguishable from random. This proves that Algorithm 1 satisfies property Strong
Entropy. □
B PSEUDORANDOM GENERATOR (PRG)
Correctness. We argue about the properties of Algorithm 2, as a source of indistinguishable-from-random
pseudo-random values.
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Lemma 4. If entropy_get() returns an indistinguishable-from-random value, then the initial 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 (line 2),
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 (line 3) and pseudo random value (𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 - line 4) will be indistinguishable from random.
Proof: Theorem 1 establishes that the output of 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑔𝑒𝑡 is indistinguishable from random. Thus, both
the 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 and the first 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 will be indistinguishable from random. Similarly, the function 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 (using
as input 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑔𝑒𝑡 - line 3), which, on most architectures, uses 64 bits to represent an unsigned long int,
will return the value 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, indistinguishable from random. □
Lemma 5. If entropy_get() returns a value indistinguishable from random, then the refreshed PRG
internal state (lines 6-8) will lead to indistinguishable from random values for 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 and 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑.
Proof: The proof follows the same argumentation of the proof of Lemma 4, for 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 and 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟. As for
𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑, assuming that neither the seed or counter are known outside the PRG, and assuming that H is a
cryptographically strong hashing function, then the output of H, having as input a concatenation of the new
𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑, current 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑, and new 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, will be indistinguishable from random. □
Theorem 2. If seed and nprd are indistinguishable-from-random values, then the next nprd returned by
PRG_next (line 12) will be indistinguishable from random.
Proof: Lemmata 4 and 5 established that both the 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 and 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 are always indistinguishable from random,
since the initial state. Assuming that HMAC is a cryptographically strong message authentication code
primitive, and that the counter is not known outside of the PRG, then the output of HMAC, keyed by
𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 and having as input a concatenation of 𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, will be indistinguishable from random. This
proves that Algorithm 2 satisfies property Robust PRG. □
C THE THREE STAGES OF ANCHOR
Figure 4 illustrates the three stages of anchor, namely, setup, normal operation, and post-compromise
recovery. After setup and post-compromise recovery, it goes to normal operation. The details of normal
operation (e.g., device registration and association) are discussed in Sections 4.6 and 4.7. The complete
post-compromise recovery protocol is presented in Section 4.9.
ANCHORNetwork AdminOff-line device
a. Off-line single mode user boot 
b. Store master recovery keys 
c. Proceed normal boot 
a. Compute the keys off-line 
b. Boot ANCHOR and copy the keys 
First boot (setup) 
Normal operation 
Recovery after a compromise 
Normal operation 
Fig. 4. Setup, normal operation and PCR
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C.1 Setup
During the setup, three things happen:
(1) Off-line single mode user boot. The first boot should be off-line to generate the master recover keys
safely. These keys need to be generated a single time and stored in a safe place.
(2) Store master recovery keys. The network admin should store the master recovery keys, for future use
in case of a compromise, in an off-line device (e.g., USB stick). This device should be kept as secure
as possible.
(3) Normal boot. After generating and safely storing the master recovery keys, the network admin can
proceed the normal boot of anchor. This boot is going to bring up all services and functionalities of
anchor and put it online, ready for use.
C.2 Normal operation
The normal operation represents the phase in which anchor should be most of the time, i.e., online and
fully operational. The normal operation phase can happen after a first boot (setup phase) or after a recovery
from a compromised state.
C.3 Recovery after a compromise
To recover anchor after a compromise, the network admin has to:
(1) Compute the keys off-line using the master recovery keys. The network admin must recursively generate
the network manager recovery keys and the device recovery keys. These are special purpose keys
used to automatically and safely recover communications between anchor and all other entities, i.e.,
without needing additional procedures such as device re-registration. For more details on how it works,
see Section 4.9.
(2) Boot anchor and copy the keys. After recursively computing the master recovery keys of managers
and devices, the network admin should proceed a normal boot of the system and copy these keys into
anchor.
D CORRECTNESS OF ALGORITHM 4
Correctness. We now formalize and prove the properties of Algorithm 4.
As a result of the registration process, anchor keeps lists of registered devices and controllers, and lists
of the controllers each device is authorized to associate with.
Proposition 1. Any device F can only associate to a controller C authorized by the anchor.
Proof: Forwarding devices will be able to associate only to controllers listed in the CList(F) provided by
A (step 2 of Algorithm 4), since if F tries to associate with a non-authorized controller (for F), A will
not proceed past step 4 after being contacted by that controller, aborting the association. On the other
hand, a rogue controller posing to F as authorised in reply to step 3, cannot jump to step 6 and invent an
association key 𝐴𝑖𝐷 that convinces F, since it does not know 𝑥𝑓 . This proves that Algorithm 4 satisfies
property Controller Authorization. □
Proposition 2. Any device F can associate to some controller, only if F is authorized by the anchor.
Manuscript accepted for publication in ACM TOPS
ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks 41
Proof: Only if a device F is legitimate, i.e. it is in the list of registered devices, will it be able to associate
to some registered controller. A will not proceed past step 1 of Algorithm 4 after being contacted by a
rogue device, aborting the association. On the other hand, a rogue device posing to C as legitimate and
authorised in step 3, will make C proceed with step 4, indeed, but the request will be rejected by A, since
𝐸𝐹 is not recognisable by A, corresponding to no shared key with a legitimate device. The replay of an old
(but legitimate) encrypted 𝐸𝐹 request in step 3 will also fail, since it is bound to the (current) nonces. This
proves that Algorithm 4 satisfies property Device Authorization. □
Proposition 3. At the end of Algorithm 4 execution, the association ID (𝐴𝑖𝐷) is only known to F and
C.
Proof: A creates 𝐴𝑖𝐷 in step 5, and forgets about it after sending it to C (see Section 4.7). 𝐴𝑖𝐷 is sent from
A to C, encrypted both by 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐹 and 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐶 , keys shared by A only with F and C respectively. C trusts
it came from A, due to the HMAC, so the two encrypted blocks should contain the same 𝐴𝑖𝐷 value, and
sends the 𝐴𝑖𝐷 under 𝐾𝑒𝐴𝐹 encryption to F. So, at the end of the execution of the algorithm, both F and
C, and only them, hold 𝐴𝑖𝐷. This proves that Algorithm 4 satisfies property Association ID Secrecy. □
Proposition 4. At the end of Algorithm 4 execution, the seed (𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷) is only known to F and C.
Proof: C creates 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 in step 7. 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 is sent from C to F, encrypted by 𝐾𝐴𝑖𝐷, association key known
only to C and F, as per Proposition 3. C trusts that F, and only F, has the same 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 sent, when it
receives back from F the XOR of 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 with the current nonce 𝑥𝑔 encrypted with 𝐴𝑖𝐷, since (as per
Proposition 3) only F could have opened the encryption of 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 with 𝐴𝑖𝐷 in the first place, and encrypt
the reply. This proves that Algorithm 4 satisfies property Seed Secrecy. □
E ONF’S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Several security requirements should be fulfilled in control plane communications. Most of these requirements
are enumerated in ONF’s best practice recommendations [91]. In this appendix we go through the eleven
(out of twenty four) such requirements that are addressed by the anchor, iDVV and NaCl.
Both communicating devices should be authenticated (REQ 4.1.1). Using our anchor, all devices have to
be properly registered and authenticated before proceeding any other operation.
Operations (e.g., association) of components should be authorized (REQ 4.1.2). The anchor needs to
explicitly authorize associations between any two devices. Each association has a unique identification.
Devices should agree upon the security (e.g., key materials) associations (REQ 4.1.3). By using the
anchor and its mechanisms, such as the source of strong entropy, we ensure strong key materials. The
iDVV mechanism is initialized by the two communicating devices once the association has been authorized
by the anchor.
Integrity of packets should be ensured (REQ 4.1.4). We provide integrity and authenticity of packets
through message authentication codes. By default, we generate one iDVV per packet, providing stronger
security.
Each device should have a unique ID and other devices should be able to verify the identity (REQ 4.2.1).
Devices are uniquely identified by the anchor. The unique IDs are associated to the devices as soon as they
are registered within the anchor.
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Issues related to the lifecycle of IDs should be managed, such as generation, distribution, maintenance,
and revocation (REQ 4.2.2). The anchor provides the services required for managing device IDs. IDs are
assigned to devices during the registration phase. Revocation can be done by network administrators at any
time.
Devices should be able to verify the integrity of each message (REQ 4.4.4). Any two communicating
devices are able to verify the integrity of each message through message authentication codes.
Amplification effects should be taken into account, i.e., attackers should not be able to perform reflection
attacks (REQ 4.4.5). We use requests and replies of the same size between devices and the anchor, which
avoids reflection attacks.
Automated key/credential management should be implemented by default, allowing generation, distribution,
and revocation of security credentials (REQ 4.8.3). We have in place automated mechanisms for refreshing
credentials, such as refresh the iDVV’s seed using the anchor’s source of strong entropy.
Data confidentiality, integrity, freshness and authenticity are ensured by the integrated device verification
value. iDVVs are used to encrypt data and generate message authentication codes. Additionally, iDVVs can
also be used as nonces, ensuring data freshness.
Availability is ensured by recommending multiple controllers to the forwarding devices. This is one of the
essential tasks of the anchor.
Lastly, it is also worth mentioning that whilst we do not meet all security requirements of ONF’s guidelines,
we do meet the fundamental ones with regard to security. For instance, requirements such as REQ 4.4.2,
REQ 4.4.3, REQ 4.7.1, REQ 4.7.2, and REQ 4.7.3 [91] are not yet covered by our architecture and protocols.
However, most of these requirements are related to rate control of messages, additional signaling messages for
dealing with future network attack types, and accountability and traceability. Such kind of requirements can
be added (in the future) without impairing our conceptual architecture. In fact, some of these requirements,
such as rate control of messages, are technical, rather than conceptual, which can be addressed with the
right amount of engineering.
Manuscript accepted for publication in ACM TOPS
